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The Kenya-born philosopher Henry Odera Oruka (1944 - 1995) persistently, and consistently, made 
proposals for a different moral approach to addressing, and possibly solving, some of the root causes 
of human conflicts across the world. I will call it “taking suffering seriously” as the basis of his idea 
of a global-level collective justice which, for him, raised the idea of the ethics of care to the level of 
global justice. I propose in this paper to show that is concern can be found to be pervasive in 
Oruka’s works, connecting many of his well known positi ns as well as less known ones, and to 
discuss its philosophical merits. 
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Introduction 
Common sense often leads us to assume that when conditions of the world change, humans will adopt 
the best means of adjusting to such changes, includi g designing and applying moral principles best 
amenable to different times. Shrunken by developments in communication science and technology 
that essentially have enhanced migration and permanently transformed the idea of home and neighbor, 
adjustments in relations at both public and private levels have brought about pluralistic views of 
culture to go with a growing sense of cosmopolitanism. But other senses of responsibility that would 
go with this pluralistic recognition have not taken root. Specifically, recognition of the once-distant 
populations as our neighbors has not led to modificat on in distributive principles to go along with a 
needed collective social justice required by our shrunken world. As a result, our contemporary world 
continues to be defined by many contradictory and polar-opposed characteristics, among them, on the 
one hand, the amazing levels of advancement in sciece and technology whose objective is to combat 
most known threats to humanity in the domain of healt  nd, on the other, the most glaring and 
worsening state of global poverty, disease, conflict and suffering. And while the idea of justice has 
risen to the top of the list of philosophical preoccupations as a way of addressing some of the social 
fragmentations that lie at the root of such conflict and suffering, it has become obvious that old ideas 
of exactly what that justice means keep many thinkers from defining and addressing contemporary 




In his works, the Kenya-born philosopher Henry Odera Oruka (1944 - 1995) persistently, and 
consistently, made proposals for a different moral approach to addressing, and possibly solving, some 
of the root causes of human conflicts across the world. I will call it “taking suffering seriously” as the 
basis of his idea of a global-level collective justice which, for him, raised the idea of the ethics of care 
to the level of global justice. I propose in this paper to show that this concern can be found to be 
pervasive in Oruka’s works, connecting many of his well known positions as well as less known ones, 
and to discuss its philosophical merits. 
 
Divergent Conceptions of “Community” 
While we all are likely to agree that caring about the welfare of other people is a good thing, we 
probably differ about whether we should or ought to. We may also disagree about whether there are 
limits in this regard, and if so, what they are. In other words, is caring about other people’s welfar a 
virtue, or is it something only commendable (praiseworthy), an act that may add to one’s honor and 
public standing but not required, that is supererogat ry but not obliging? Considering questions like 
these can be difficult. They stem from how we consider, as traditions have taught us, our relations 
with others, and whether relating to others adds anythi g to what our nature is believed to be. The 
great Western philosopher Aristotle, for example, talked of ends, the final cause of all things whose 
existence was guided by processes of change and becoming, or whose character was grounded in 
action. For humans, Aristotle wrote about what he called eudaimonia, achieving one’s potential 
(Ethics, X,7, 1177a11). The question then is: does relating to others add to one’s attainment of 
eudaimonia? And if so, what kind of relations have that value? At another point (Ethics, I, 4, 
1095a,19) he says that at least everyone agrees that happiness is somehow “living well, “doing well”. 
What does it mean for a person to “live well”, to “do well”, to “live a fulfilled life” or, said differently, 
to attain contentment or happiness in the sense of eudaimonia? 
 
Aristotle was a brilliant philosopher who thought carefully about matters. So while the exposition of 
the idea of eudaimonia gives the impression of his interest only in what individuals can do to fulfill 
their being persons, just like a Jacaranda tree attains its end when it attains its full growth and blossom 
as it was meant to be, which might be right too, he also considered relations between people, because 
humans live and interact with each other all the time under many varieties of relations. These relations 
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are guided by what Aristotle called philia, getting along with others, such as colleagues of a 
disciplinary department, members of the Senior Commn Room, of an academic class or trade union, 
club, etc. It is in this vein that he talked of some kind of philia as abiding in a community and 
connecting its members (Ethics, VIII, 9). 
 
However, it would be grossly misleading to think that Aristotle thought of community the way many 
African peoples do. He thought of community more in the sense of people who live in a fairly small 
village or town, so that they share a post office, hardware store, or the pub where those who care for 
its offerings meet with such frequency that they know each other or discuss their elected leaders.  
Most people today, on the other hand, tend to think of community as a geographically or 
genealogically connected individuals who are bound to each other by mutual expectations of care. 
 
So how did Aristotle think people in a community should relate to each other ethically? To be sure, 
this is an ambiguous question as it relates to Aristotle. The term “community” is understood 
differently in accordance with the cultural norms that inform it. Often, people think of a community as 
the set of individuals who, by virtue of the proximity of their abode, share a post office, market or 
general store where they get their procurements; they s are a police station for security, a fire station, 
and so on. These people need not know each other at the personal level, and do not have to care for 
each other beyond the general and detached sense in which we feel for someone else when they have 
been robbed, or when their dog dies, or just the comm n feeling or desire that there be peace in the 
neighborhood so everyone could mind their business without disruption. In other words, people in 
such a community “get along”: they may greet each other in the street, or discuss an upcoming or past 
soccer game, etc. In that kind of “community, someone we know – because we happen to live in the 
same “community” would not come to ask us for salt if they discovered at a late hour that they had run 
out, or come to say “pole” (Kiswahili expression of sympathy) if a neighbor across the ridge broke 
their leg or had some other little misfortune, let alone a big one like losing a loved one. 
 
Because Aristotle thought of community in these comp site senses of detached individuals whose 
relations were regulated only by sharing institutional services, he likened individual-community 
relations to the relations of a person’s bodily limbs to each other in their self-constituting roles: for 
anyone to consider her-or-him-self in well being, not only must her or his limbs be in good health, 
they also must perform the functions they were made for - each one to themselves for their respective 
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and complementary activities to cohere in making up the active health of the body and of the person as 
such (Aristotle 1941, pp.1081-3, Bk. IX, Ch. 4, 1166a - b). 
 
These are some of the elements of Aristotle’s view that community, or society for that matter, is but an 
individual writ large. For the true and interactive relations, Aristotle’s focus went to friendships: 
personal relations, governed by attractions that bring two people together on the basis of something 
shared between them. It is for this reason that he talk d of those relations that went beyond merely 
“getting along” only in terms of friendship. This, he said, can be observed to be of three main kinds, 
corresponding to the three objects of love, each of which, in turn, he said, has a corresponding type of 
mutual loving, combined with awareness of it. The tree species of friendship are: 
(a) Relationships based on mutual advantage; 
(b) Relationships based on mutual acknowledgment; 
(c) Relationships based on mutual admiration (Aristotle 1941, pp. 997-8, Bk. IV: Ch. 6, 1126b 
12- 1127a 13).2 
 
Whatever their circumstance, these relationships are b sed on choice or private attractions or interests, 
always mutual according to Aristotle, and may be thonly ones that define the direct mutual 
exchanges within a community. The interests that bind those involved carry the sense of special 
relations that may not be extended to others. The last kind, for example, specially binds two 
individuals who recognize some intrinsic value in each other’s character that is mutually admirable 
and attractive to them. 
 
Furthermore, in Aristotle’s view, the third type of friendship appears to not have direct or obvious 
interests involved between any two friends, but even th re, loving someone because she/he has the 
character you like can cause gratification, especially when and because it is accompanied by 
awareness by each party that they are held in esteem by someone, and that reciprocation is expected. 
In Book IX, under the discussion of benevolence and friendship, Aristotle claims that benefactors do 
not wish well to their beneficiaries for any reason ther than that they may live to give them 
acknowledgement, which is a kind of pleasure or gratific tion associated with social standing or 
public image that one gains in society. For that reson, obviously, the benefactor “produces” the 
                                                   
2 The discussion on friendships is taken up again in Bks. VIII and IX. 
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beneficiary for his/her own gain, and so “likes his/ er product more than the product likes its 
producer” (Aristotle 1941, p. 1085, Bk. IX: Ch. 7, 1168a 2-10). In accordance with Aristotle’s general 
metaphysics, this is all natural since, like all natur l things, humans too attain their fullness in activity, 
not in passiveness like, in his view, is the state of every beneficiary of the benevolence of a 
benefactor. Hence, a benefactor does not attain anything more by giving than his own calculated 
interests. 
 
It is easy from reading Aristotle to see the foundation of later Western moral theory, especially as 
found in Kant’s work, and more recently in the work f the American philosopher John Rawls (1973), 
especially as it relates to the concept and requirements of justice. Primary to the objective of morals in 
these works are, among other related points, the following values: the autonomy of the individual and 
union with others; liberty, unity, congruence or integrity, and moral worth of the individual; self-
respect, and equality. They are discussed in the already mentioned Chapters of the Nichomachean 
Ethics, in the Preface to Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysic of Morals (Kant 1981, 2-4), as well as 
in Rawls’s  A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1973, Chapters VII, VIII, and IX). In Kant’s famous but now 
widely criticized position, it just happens to be th  case that  human life is lived in community with 
others, which provides ample occasions for practical judgements or wisdom, but the latter, that is, the 
social circumstance of human life, is only the “field” in which each person carries out what is actually 
only her/his integral metaphysical constitution, namely the obligatoriness to act in morally meaningful 
ways, where both the obligatoriness and meaningfulness of the act - the goodness of acting or doing 
good - are directed at, or are driven by the metaphysical make-up alone, without the well-being of 
others as part of the consideration. 
 
Aristotle’s position that the actions of a benefactor must stem solely from her/his metaphysical 
requirement appears to be consistent with Kant’s own position that doing what is right must be viewed 
independently of its possible practical consequences as the moral law is present a priori in reason. The 
well being of the beneficiary of a benefactor’s actions is not and must not be the object of a 
benefactor’s action, nor should a benefactor’s action be driven by the unacceptability of a prospectiv 
beneficiary’s condition. In this sense, then, Aristotle’s idea of friendship is one that defines only the
“point where” the moral action of a moral actor in g ving, part of her/his metaphysical requirement, a 
obligation in Kant, happens to “land”. In their views, moral actions ought to be driven by duty alone, 
not by what is deemed or even known to be their possible consequences. In this picture, which, as we 
shall see, includes John Rawls’s idea of justice, th re is no “care” the way we tend to understand it. 
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Rather, it privileges the idea of the autonomy and freedom of the individual whose actions ought to be 
directed toward the promotion of her/his own interests. The three prominent Western figures concur in 
thinking, in a manner that directly connects metaphysics with morality,  that the basic tenets of human 
rights is the right to life, to freedom, and to thepursuit of one’s own happiness. 
 
Individualist ethical theory claims that self-promotion ought to be the primary daily preoccupation of 
everyone except in cases of dispensing social duty toward those who depend on us. The latter cases 
would naturally be limited to children below the age of legal onset of adulthood, after which they 
would be expected to start their own self-promotion. But this position is descriptive first before it 
turns into a normative one. At the descriptive leve, it asserts what one is brought up with, namely that
“you matter first, over, above, and before anyone els ”. To this position, individuals matter first 
because, in a reductionist metaphysics, humans, like a l things, are reducible to their basic composite 
parts which ought to be understood as standing on their own except in those cases where their 
dependency is paramount. To this view, individuals are not only born as such, they also grow to attain 
and perfect this autonomy. To the dominant Western mode of thought, autonomy is the metaphysical 
foundation and goal of human life, hence the obligation to cultivate and protect it. In this respect, the
observation by some scholars that neither individual sm nor communitarianism can assert or justify 
itself without recognition of the other happens therefore to be descriptively uncommitted to the 
recognition of the real and important differences btween the two. It only leads, at best, to the limited 
view of communitarianism in Western social philosophy which, for the same reasons, traces its origins 
back to Aristotle, and has some expressions in Christian philosophy. 
 
Theorists who pursue or take the individualist and duty-driven view for normativizing moral law and 
political policy will argue, like Aristotle and Kant did, that doing what is right is all that matters. And 
they will argue that such duty-based morality preseves both the individual and society at large. It is 
on this basis - the Kantian ethics’ as well as Rawlsian justice’s idea of impartiality - that they further 
argue that because the expectation that people focus on others’ welfare, especially where there is no 
connection to the benefactor, is unlikely to be metby many, it cannot make a moral difference, and 
hence cannot be morally significant. In response, critics – whom, for lack of a better term, I will call 
communitarians – argue that because individualism is learned, so people can, and ought, to learn to 
care. Communitarians share the concept of “relationl self” as a way of instituting an alternative 
axiom to that which starts with “care of the self”, but they see differently how the self connects with 
others. 
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To many Western anti-individualists, the self connects with others through love as the engine for the 
promotion of good and caring in personal and social rel tions. The basis for this idea of otherness as 
driven by empathy is the alliance in Western thought between the ethics of care and feminist ethical 
theory, (see e.g. Hekman 1995), but it embraces elements of pragmatist philosophy, especially in the 
brand of John Dewey’s moral philosophy3, the idea of continuity between all inhabitants of nature. 
This idea can be stated generally thus: that humans, as part of nature, develop, in the evolutionary 
sense of the term, aspects of the self that enable them to connect with the rest of the inhabitants 
therein, including connections with each other. Thepragmatist call is, then, that we should inquire 
carefully to identify those aspects of human behavior which enhance this integration and connection. 
Because it embraces and demands attention toward others’ well-being, love must be a good thing 
because its purpose is to guarantee, besides itselfa  a value, also other goods like peace, 
collaboration, and others. Because love sits right at the point that separates the experience of suffering 
from that of happiness and satisfaction, its value o ght to be seen as empirically intertwined with the 
positive desire for survival and for an acceptable quality of human life. 
  
To be sure, love is describable only as an inclinatio , meaning that it is a drawing toward something 
or someone for reasons that are usually subjective and unreplicable. Acts of love are performed on 
one’s volition, such as Aristotle recognized of thebonds of friendship. In other words, it stands in 
sharp contrast to duty or obligation, to obedience of a law. The latter is what generates and guards 
justice, not love. So, one may ask, how did Oruka conceive care? Or did he really talk of care, or of 
something else altogether? Put another way, what is there in Oruka’s thought about “otherness” that 
would warrant the view that caring about the welfar of those in need is a matter not of love or 
empathy but of obligation, duty, justice?   
 
Oruka and a communitarian sense of moral obligation 
In what follows, I wish to show, however only briefly in view of the limitation of space imposed by 
the nature of the document which these observations are to be part of, that the late Henry Odera Oruka 
(1944-1995), one of Africa’s most influential recent philosophers, thought about considering other 
                                                   
3 See his The Quest for Certainty, New York, Minton Balch Publishers, 1929.(especially important is 
chapter 10, “The construction of good”). 
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people’s welfare in radically different ways from how, say, Aristotle, or Kant, or Rawls, have 
influentially led philosophers to believe we ought to do. 
 
Whether the ethics of nurture or care is sufficient for convincing people to take the welfare of others 
seriously in a progressive moral and political sense is yet to be seen. In fact, care, in the form of 
empathy, stands in contrast to justice. While care is good, as is evidenced by the many works of 
charity that have transformed the lives of millions across the globe by improving their conditions or 
saving them from death, such acts lack the sense of duty that justice entails, nor can their beneficiar es 
demand such benefits as their rights. It is therefore a completely different matter to argue that giving 
to those in need is the right or just thing to do, and not merely the good thing to do on grounds of 
empathy. Oruka viewed the general principle of care, namely the concern for others’ welfare, such as 
undertaking to eradicate poverty, as a more serious moral and political matter than a mere or only an 
occasional act of generosity. He saw it as a moral obligation that is consistent with the principle of 
justice. In accord with Aristotle, Oruka feared that emphasis on empathy as the reason for giving to 
those in need is likely to reduce a beneficiary into an appendage of the benefactor (Oruka 1997, 83-
90). 
 
According to Aristotle, a beneficiary exists in her or his  own right, as someone who, except for the 
circumstances of need they are trapped in, should be taken to bear most other aspects of human 
dignity. Such a person would not care less about the benefactor. By contrast, a benefactor’s status is 
conditioned by the existence of the beneficiary. With such realization, a benefactor may seek a 
beneficiary so as to forge the relations by which to augment her/his own public standing or status. The 
nineteenth-century philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, once observed that the master-slave relations 
reveal far greater dependency of the master on the slav for his status than is usually assumed. Thus, 
by acting or behaving toward the master in those manners as are prescribed for a slave, the slave 
affirms and sustains the status of the master (Nietzsche 1966, 1967). In the context of the emergence 
in Africa of the new socio-economic elitism against the backdrop of the poverty of the masses, Oruka 
 worried about the erosion of the human dignity of the less fortunate - Aristotle’s beneficiaries - and 
he worried that there was an imminent risk that the poor would turn into modern slaves to their own 
kin or fellow citizens. At the global level, he argued, richer nations would strive to sustain the gap 
between them and poor nations as a way of sustaining the circumstances of inequality and dependency 
from which ensues their status as benefactors. While relations of inequality such as intimated by 
Aristotle in his analysis of benefactor-beneficiary relations appear to exist everywhere, including 
32 D.A. Masolo 
 
within the more affluent global north itself, it is also true that in the language of socio-economic and 
political blocs, the global north, or the Western world as it is variably called, wields unchallenged 
power over the poorer global south that it once colonized. 
 
While Oruka was not known to have referred to himself as a socialist, his practical mindfulness of 
others’ welfare, especially those in need, and his strong philosophical belief that disadvantages suchas 
poverty, local or national, regional or global, were kept in place by unjust politics, do not portray him 
as any less progressive a thinker than those who have pursued those arguments explicitly. His views 
present a strong case for a better sharing of world resources at different levels of the stratum of social 
life and organization, that is, at the family level, national level, and at the global level (see esp.Oruka 
1997).  
 
Oruka and the idea of the minimum 
Here is how Oruka sets off his critique of Rawls: 
John Rawls introduces an egalitarian formula in the concept of Justice. But he does so 
on the plane of a liberal-capitalist conception of justice which corrodes the formula 
and the theory turnsm out as a subtle defence of Welfare-Capitalism. Rawls’ claim, 
that his theory could be accommodated within both the private economic system and 
the socialist oriented one is therefore incorrect (see Oruka 1980, 77).4 
 
Oruka set out to show in the essay that although there were ways of adjusting Rawls’ theory by 
salvaging egalitarian elements therein to make it suitable to “a modern enderdeveloped country”, 
Rawls’ theory was by and large nothing less than a liberal-capitalist theory of justice.  Let us again 
consider Aristotle’s idea of “action”, of which “giving” was illustrated as part, as thus soliciting the
question: how does a person fulfil her/his metaphysical self-realization, or, in Aristotle’s own 
vocabulary, happiness? To this question, a possible answer could run as follows: by developing and 
using in their fullness the various capacities thatsuch (kind of) a being - humans - is endowed with: 
                                                   
4This essay was subsequently published under a slightly modified title, “John Rawls’ Ideology: Justice 
as Egalitarian Fairness”, in a collection of Oruka’s essays, almost all of them previously published or presented 
at meetings, and published posthumously under the title of Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical 
Minimum, Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, 1997. Due to my familiarity with both versions of the 
text (the second version had no alterations other than introduction of subtitles for sections in place of Roman 
letterings in the original one), I have taken the lib rty of using both sources with occasional cross-referencing. 
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physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, and psychological. Other, and more specific capacities may be 
attained as sub-categories of the listed general ones, or as manifestations of different combinations of 
the general ones. For example, the capacity to be an excellent dancer may be developed as the result 
of a combination of physical, intellectual, and psychological developments. Thus the capacities listed 
above enable humans to pursue that ideal prototype human existence. Under them lie specific 
attainments whose values in turn lie in the general condition in which human life is consummated: in 
society. 
 
Each individual person has one cardinal obligation: t  do all those things, as commanded by her/his 
specific capacities, that lead to her/his final end, fulfilment, or happiness consistent with the defining 
capacities of the species. The idea of basic rights is derived from this Aristotelian metaphysical view 
of specific ends. Because these capacities can be realized only in society, the regulation of the extent 
to which everyone can continue to pursue their self-realization without denying or impeding the same 
for others leads to the simple ideas of social justice as irrevocably grounded on the primacy or priority 
of  liberty under which alone individuals are not trapped in the potentiality of realizing the rights, but 
actually engage in those pursuits. This train of thught comes down from Aristotle, is reworked by 
Kant at the height of enlightenment against institutional authority of any kind, and is finally and 
strongly reaffirmed by Rawls at the height of debating across the world types and modalities of 
arriving at post-WW II political organizations as cognates of new and stable social and political 
policies. 
 
Ethical questions that arise from the broad socio-political conditions of those times may include, but
are not limited to the following: one, considerations of the degree, and under what sort of 
circumstances it is ethically sound to enable people to pursue the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number of people. Put in interrogative terms, is it ethically defendable to restrict the freedom of 
people by making them sacrifice such liberty for the benefit of the less advantaged? Or, is 
egalitarianism a higher good than liberty? If so, why? And are there some specific liberties and rights 
in respect to which people are equal, and others in espect to which they may not be? In one view 
(although the degree to which these principles were applied to perfection may be only by speculative 
assumption), people have equal liberty and right to vote and to hold public office; they have liberty 
and right to freedom of speech and of assembly; the have equal liberty of, and right to thought. But 
they may not have the liberty and right to acquire personal wealth to the degree that their abilities 
allow them. In another view, that held by Rawls andpeople of like-minds, individuals are to be free in 
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all aspects, such that, in Rawls’ words, “Each person i  to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of equal liberty for all” (Rawls 
1973, 302). 
 
So, what does Rawls mean when he argues that what the less fortunate get in the system of inequality 
that he defends would be far less were they not to accept those conditions?  It is obvious that he is 
considering the arrangements in a capitalist system where, in his view, even the less fortunate, the 
poor, are still better off than those people who live n circumstances where their freedoms are 
curtailed such that they would not have even the littl they now have under the capitalist system. As 
Oruka observed in the opening sentences we quoted above, Rawls’ text was written as a formidable 
ethical defense of the capitalist system whose biggest ift, he argued, was the inviolable liberty. 
 
In other words, Oruka observes, “Although their liberty may in practice be worth far less than that 
enjoyed by the rich, Rawls argues that this loss is nevertheless compensated for by the very nature of 
the [capitalist] system” (Oruka 1997, 116). 
 
One can draw an illustration of Rawls from a famous incident in African history, specifically the 
famed declaration by Ahmed Sèkou Touré of Guinea to President Charles de Gaule of France. As 
historians put it, in 1958, after realizing that the agitation by Africans for independence from their 
colonizers was going to be unstoppable, Charles de Gaule, then President of France, took trips aimed 
at requesting leaders of independence movements in French colonies to remain members of a global 
organization of Francophonie – to be similar to that of the British empire named the “Commonwealth 
Association”. In their encounter, Sèkou Touré is reported to have defiantly told de Gaule: “My people 
have no desire to join your organization, for they prefer liberty in poverty to riches in bondage” (see 
Hallett 1974 for exact quotation). So it appears, at least on the surface, that, like Sèkou Touré, Rawls 
believed that the price of liberty was worth the degre  of poverty that one experiences as a result of 
the inequalities it engenders, except for the fact that Sèkou Touré and Rawls had contrary views of 
liberty, making the contrast between them serve as r presentations of the bi-polar character of liberty 
that came to define global politics in the post- WW II era. 
 
While Sèkou Touré viewed liberty as a collective value that is enjoyed only when members of society 
through instruments put in place and controlled by them keep individual pursuits of happiness in 
check, Rawls, by contrast, views individual human beings as autonomous moral agents, each 
Care versus Justice: Odera Oruka and the Quest for Global Justice 35 
 
independently pursuing a freely chosen course of action with reason and dignity. True to its 
Aristotelian roots, the Rawlsian individual bears her/ is own duty toward her/his self-realization 
(happiness) commensurate with her/his endowments. Thus, although he would have agreed with 
Sèkou Touré in regard to the primacy of liberty, he nonetheless would have repudiated the (socialist) 
conditions under which Sèkou Touré’s individual would have to live in as worth far less than the 
liberty in poverty under a liberal system even if supported by a paternalistic colonial power. 
 
The rhetoric in American political ideology that it is right to tax the wealthy proportionately less than 
those at the bottom of the income ladder because such inequality is to the advantage of the latter group 
seems to have been borrowed straight from the pages of A Theory of Justice. According to Rawls, 
“Men share in primary goods on the principle that some can have more if they are acquired in ways 
which improve the situation of those who have less” (Rawls 1973, 94). 5 But what are those conditions 
in real life? In their opposition to taxing the rich more, American Republicans have countered that 
such a measure will force the rich, especially those who own small businesses, to ship their businesses 
and American jobs abroad to avoid higher taxes and to seek cheap labour. In the wake of the global 
economic crisis that started roughly around 2007, this argument appeared plausible to the conservative 
American constituencies, even as it unveiled the ugly and inhumane side of unchecked capitalism, 
namely that exploitation may look bad, but the exploited are far better off with a job that exploits them 
than they would be without one. Put another way, in the eyes of conservative capitalism for which A 
Theory of Justice could be seen to serve as a blueprint, a rotten fish is till better than no fish at all. 
Translated back into an anti-Sèkou Touré analogy, neo-colonial bondage would still be a far better 
situation than liberty on an empty stomach. 
 
Oruka sketched Rawls’ fairness formula as follows: “... distribution of social goods is to be equal to 
the extent that the less fortunate receive no less than what they can obtain given and using their own
capacity in a free market competition” (Oruka 1997, 117). Assume, for example, that, each person 
who lives in Nairobi is free in principle to compete o live in the best housing in the best 
neighbourhood that their capacity can allow them. May be this is true, in principle. Therefore, as I say 
also later, it is in service of fairness that those who either live in make-shift shacks along Nairobi 
River or can afford only a room in Mathare No. 10, or Korogocho, have got their fair share because 
                                                   
5Also quoted by Oruka, see “Rawls’ Ideological Affinity and Justice as Egalitarian Fairness”, in Justice: 
Social and Global, p.79. 
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that is what free competition has allotted them. It would be unfair only if they were caused to have 
less than this by reason of someone else, or a group of people, who opted to want to live in Muthaiga 
or Lavington. In other words, unfairness would arise only in those circumstances, as we are just too 
often accustomed to seeing, in which someone or a group of individuals, or the government, razed 
Mathare, or Kibera, in order to create room for a neighbourhood like Muthaiga or Lavington from 
which the original residents of Mathare or Kibera were not only excluded, but their circumstances 
were made worse than they had been. 
 
It is not hard to see that Rawls’ biggest concern was the curtailment of freedom for individuals to 
exercise their capacities to attain for themselves whatever they possibly could under “open market 
competition”. In other words, Rawls accepted that eg litarianism was the nemesis of freedom which 
he regarded as the inviolable supreme value of the human condition. Yet he was quite aware that 
freedom was not given to all in equal measure, and he seems to have come to terms with this as a 
reality: slavery improved the lives of its victims, hence, it would appear to go, it was justice that slave 
owners deserved to be free, and to own their slaves because the lives of the slaves were thereby 
improved. And, to complete his train of thought, it would not have amounted to justice for slaves to 
demand and obtain freedom if their lives under freedom were going to be worse than under slavery. 
 
Besides, it is difficult, and almost at the risk of being unfair to history,  not to read A Theory of Justice 
with reference to the American historical scourge. So, while Rawls’ focus may have been clouded by 
the need to defend the American ideological choice by fending off what he and those who thought like 
he did saw as a modern form of slavery that appeared to sweep across the world in the post-WW II 
period, namely the socialist political economy as a form of “enslavement of the majority” under the 
power of the state, he wrote A Theory of Justice as a Manifesto of the brand of economic theory 
advanced by Adam Smith in Britain. The preferable social order envisioned by the free market model 
of Adam Smith, as Oruka saw it in his hypothetical SUWJ (Society of Unbalanced or Wild Justice) 
(Oruka 1997, 118-121; see also Rawls 1973, 81-84), is one in which a few individuals , usually just 
one percent of society, embody the freedom that the majority only desire and idealize. 
 
Autonomy and individualism 
It is clear enough that we are individuals in our persons – in our bodies and in relation to many of our 
interests, especially those interests that relate directly and obviously to our bodily care such as our 
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health, our aesthetics, and to some degree, our belongings. Our individuality is equally manifested in 
how we process stimuli from our surroundings. But it is also clear that we live in communion with 
others, in families of all kinds, and in our interactions with them in sharing the services of institutions, 
which, incidentally, are themselves products of our recognition of common needs and the need for 
collaboration to address them. But differences about which of these should dominate how we 
consummate and create the principles of our relations based on the measure of the relations between 
individuals mark separations between the value systems across the globe – at the socio-political levels, 
and more subtly at the level of everyday cultural experiences. Formally, such differences are the basis 
of movements of theory and practice. As Isaiah Berlin writes, such “great movements began with 
ideas in people’s heads: ideas about what relations between men have been, are, might be, and should 
be; and to realise how they came to be transformed in the name of a vision of some supreme goal in 
the minds of the leaders, above all of the prophets with armies at their backs. Such ideas are the 
substance of ethics. Ethical thought consists of the systematic examination of the relations of human 
beings to each other, the conceptions, interests and ideals from which human ways of treating one 
another spring, and the systems of value on which su ends of life are based. There beliefs about 
how life should be lived, what men and women should be and do, are objects of moral inquiry; and 
when applied to groups and nations, and, indeed, mankind as a whole, are called political philosophy, 
which is but ethics applied to society” (Berlin 1990, 1-2). 
 
Emphasis on inviolable individual autonomy, and obligation to attend to the cultivation and protection 
of the properties that define such autonomy, such as providing or adhering to the conditions or 
provisions that promote the enjoyment by each person of such autonomy pervades and underlines the 
historical progression of Western societies as we hav  come to know them in their historical formation 
and expressions. The Enlightenment entrenched the idea of individual autonomy in moral, political, 
and legal theory, extricating him/her from collective social control either in the form of traditions or 
state oversight, before the social movements of the Tw ntieth century. According to David Harvey, 
the life of the social movements was cut short by aglobal re-emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s, 
especially in the pivotal two-year period, which he refers to as the “revolutionary turning-point in the 
world’s social and economic history”, between 1978 and 1980, such as is evidenced by ascendancy to 
political power of three influential figures, namely Deng Xiaoping in China in 1978, Margaret 
Thatcher’s take over of the British premiership in 1979, and Ronald Reagan’s American presidency in 
1980 and, as a fourth button in the world political-economic order, Paul Volcker’s assumption of his 
position at the US Federal Reserve in 1979 (Harvey 2005, 1). China may seem to be in odd company 
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here, but, according to Harvey, they were all movers toward “Deregulation, privatization, and 
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision [which, in his view,] have been all too 
common. 
 
As recent examples of attempts to curtail the powers of labor unions, or to eliminate them altogether, 
as in recent Tea-Party-driven legislations in some US states may have indicated, the push is to 
eliminate any form of collective responsiveness to and responsibility for common welfare, preferring 
instead, in the logic of the push, to premise the creation of social good on the maximization of 
competition in the open and self-regulating marketplace. Of course the implications can be seen easily 
even by such untrained eyes as mine or those of Onyango in the streets of Nairobi, namely that to 
maximize the gains of the open marketplace, the geographical reaches of the market must be made 
greater, and the market contracts shortened for efficient performance. 
 
The socio-economic implications of such a new world der are some of the matters that preoccupied 
Oruka. Without explicitly espousing what has come to be commonly referred to as the communitarian 
ethic, the grim consequences for the majority of humanity worried Oruka deeply. Sometimes he may 
not have seen the implications of this newly proposed order, such as when he critiqued Kwasi 
Wiredu’s theory of truth6, but both in his life and in his attention to the ethical principles of a 
preferable social order, there could not be a mistake as to how Oruka thought of the inequities in 
human life at different levels. The threads of his discomfort with liberalism, if we may restrict it to he 
socio-ethical domain only, can be found in both his essays as well as in the interviews and 
conversations with some of the sages. 
 
In conversation with Paul Mbuya Akoko, Odera asks for clarification of the reason for communalism 
(see Oruka ed. 1990, 141-3). In response, Mbuya Akoko clarifies, first, that communalism must not be 
confused with the idea that “people ought to share everything” as no sane society will fail to recognize 
a certain measure of individuality, or the notion and value of individual uniqueness such as can be 
manifested in intelligence, creativity and originalty in dance or other skills such as orature, 
                                                   
6See, for example, his “Truth and Belief”, in Universitas, Vol. 5, No.1 (November, 1975), pp.177-184; 
Wiredu’s response can be found in Wiredu, Kwasi, “In Defense of Opinion”, Universitas, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 
1976), pp. 197-210; Finally, Oruka’s essays on the theme appeared as seven chapters of Part I of his Practical 
Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum, Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, 1997 
(posthumously). 
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leadership, and hard work. But these do not trump the underlying reality that even with such 
expressions of individuality, all persons are part of an organic order of community. That this latter 
aspect of human reality is chronologically basic to everyone can be demonstrated by the fact that an 
organic theory of selfhood as rooted in every person’s relations with others is what makes it possible 
for individuals to cultivate those qualities with which their individuality is associated. For example, 
orature is a skill only in the context of the judgement of other people in terms of its appeal to them in 
respect of aesthetic standards of use of language. 
 
In Mbuya’s view, then, the first call to all people of responsibility is toward the protection and 
sustenance of a community of responsible individuals, meaning persons who recognize the debt to 
others as members of the community they share. This, Mbuya Akoko further argues, is done by 
requiring that every person in the community has the minimum amount of those benefits without 
which they are not likely to live such life as will enable them to become responsible members of the 
community. Among such requirements were material needs for the sustenance of life (everyone needs 
to get from the community life provisions such as food, clothing, and shelter if they cannot provide for 
themselves), and for the fulfilment of a dignified life expected of all normal persons who were judged 
to have acceptable grounds for not being able to fulfill such expectation on their own (every member 
of the community deserved to have a shot at marriage and to raise a family of their own, because 
marriage gave an individual social values beyond merely having company). 
 
Back to Oruka’s critique of Rawls’s liberalism 
As a result of the communitarian ethic, people confronted major threats in life collectively with others 
as members of a community, thus lessening the effects or visibility of such conditions as famine and 
poverty. While discouraging laziness and other causes of exploitative character traits, communities 
were often blamed for failing to meet their expected r sponsibilities toward their deserving members.  
In Mbuya Akoko’s explanation, people need to be given the opportunity to prove themselves, for even 
hard workers will need in-put of capital to start and finally be able to stand on their own. In 
concurrence with John Rawls, and with Mbuya Akoko’s rejection of totalitarian or doctrinnaire 
socialism (in which there is no private ownership of roperty in the form of wealth), wealth - at least 
some reasonable amount of it -  and income are such primary goods that no individual should be 
denied them. But that is probably the extent of the s ared values. From there, divergences rip systems 
apart. Emerging from a liberal perspective, Rawls’ view stipulates that the individual has inviolable 
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rights, and must therefore want to have such rights as the basic civil liberties (freedom of speech, 
freedom to vote and to stand for public office, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought and 
conscience) and the freedom and right to hold personal property. For Rawls, the other principle of 
justice addresses social and economic freedoms and rights, according to which access to wealth, while 
recognizing an arrangement that gives “greatest benefit to the least advantaged”, is nonetheless to be
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 
1973, 302). 
 
Oruka worries that in Rawls’s system the least advantaged are actually not taken care of, as Rawls 
argues that they can be taken care of only to the extent of what they themselves would be able to 
obtain on their own capacity in the free market, thus they must not receive less than such a level. In 
this system, there is no equality – whatever this may ean, but the poor, or least advantaged must be 
grateful under the arrangement that they have anything at all, because their condition would be far 
worse if they do not accept such an arrangement. There is a mirage of benefit to the poor here, namely 
that while the well-off may not get the maximum of their wants that their capacity could get them, the 
less fortunate must. Thus, in Rawls’s view, a society acts in line with the principle of justice if the 
improvement in the condition of the rich helps to improve, or at least does not diminish, the condition 
of the poor. The overriding principle is the freedom f all to pursue whatever lifestyle they wish to 
under equal opportunity. Equality is judged by “benchmarks”, not flatly across the board, thus 
allowing “Inequalities [to be] permissible when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long-
term expectations of the least fortunate group in society” (Oruka 1997, 117).7 
 
Here is the core of Oruka’s dissatisfaction with Rawls’s “Republic of Justice”: it does not address 
what the “own capacity” of the least advantaged is or can allow them. Hence protecting such persons 
by simply sustaining them at the level where their own capacity would take/bring them may be far less 
than what human dignity would allow (Oruka 1997, 117-118). Hence it may be considered acceptable 
under Rawls’s theory that a homeless person is to be sustained at the homelessness status because 
their own capacity would not allow them to have a better standard of living, so long as she/he does not 
sink deeper or get worse than she/he already is, especially as an effect of the self-improvement of 
society’s rich. You can clearly see the moral groundings of the differences currently driving the divie 
                                                   
7Oruka makes reference to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, pp.94 and 151. 
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in American politics in regard to proposed differentials in taxation policies and practices. The moral 
of the argument by those who oppose taxing the rich more is that the only thing individuals can 
control is to legally apply themselves to producing a ything, and everything they possibly can based 
on their capabilities, and noone should take even a dot of it from them more than their fair share. 
 
As we said earlier, recent political events in the United States, as well as developments in 
contemporary liberal theory, underscore the extent of the influence of Rawls’s theory. Rawls argues 
that citizens are rational enough not to allow the em rgence of “unacceptable differences” between the 
haves and have-nots. But we have seen that this is not always the case. It may be the position of onlya 
small group of the ultra-right wing, but opposition to government guarantee of a certain minimum 
access to healthcare for the poor by limiting the control of health insurance companies not only 
unveils the absence of such reason, it also signals the ack of care among liberals for a social order. In 
fact, in this matter, liberals and conservatives find themselves to be unlikely bedfellows as supporters 
of the removal of any form of social control of the liberty of the individual to pursue as her/his reason 
allows within the limits of the law. Never mind tha the push by ultra conservatives, such as their push
to repeal delegalization of certain forms of discrimination (under the principle of the liberty of 
individuals or businesses to do and pursue as they de m to be in their economic interests) may finally 
put the odd bedfellows on a shoving relationship. Sometimes, however, concomitant circumstances 
may put ideological strangers on the same path without them necessarily sharing the principles of the 
course. 
 
One major weakness, not just of the ethical theory advanced by Rawls, but also generally of the 
human psyche, as suggested by critics of Rawls, say, Robert Paul Wolff (1977, 11), for example, is 
how to lead the rational self-interested, pleasure-maximizing individual to substitute general happiness 
for their own as the object of their actions. This is imilar to Oruka’s own position. The preservation 
of one’s own legally acquired interests may be a good principle, but, in Oruka’s view, the general well 
being of society is a greater good, so long as indiv duals’ contribution to the attainment of such 
general well being does not adversely affect the well being of contributors. Oruka would therefore 
vote with those who propose the taxation of the “super rich” at a higher rate. As the popular parlance 
puts it, it does not make sense to tax a billionaire t a lower rate than her/his Secretary is taxed. This,
as we just pointed out, is the point that Oruka aims to make in his discussion with Paul Mbuya Akoko 
about social responsibility and the ethics of care in Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and 
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Modern Debate on African Philosophy (Oruka ed. 1990, 141-3). 8. 
 
The problem is not about merely convincing someone t  think of others’ welfare, for they may do so 
once or a few times because “it is a good thing”. Ultimately, however, there needs to be a context that 
makes such conviction warranting, plausible, and possible. Those of us who live and work away from 
our indigenous cultural environments may encounter examples of this rather frequently. For example, 
if you want to make your American students to think about how matters they often take so much for 
granted that they are a “no brainer” are indeed not so obviously “no brainer”, then ask them about 
how they would react to thinking about the welfare of other people, a friend, a relative, or just an 
acquaintance, for instance, not just as a side-issue but as something far more serious and obliging. 
You are likely to see them frown, as though you had just side-stepped the “obvious” course of moral 
reasoning. Of course, the molding of cultural habits, built on some unquestioned or axiomatic cultural 
assumptions, have all combined to make the “fact” that everyone has the sole obligation to her/his 
own interests the “obvious” view. 
 
Philosophers are neither blind to nor exempt from these perspective formations of themselves and 
how they think of the world. Like everyone else in the line of cultural descent, they too are heirs. In 
Rawls’s case, the defense of the rights and liberties of the individual are part of the Anglo-American 
heredity of the moral theory erected by Immanuel Kant - with applications to conditions evolved out 
of very specific historical, social, economic and political circumstances. They inform his models of 
analysis and argument. Moral psychology is developed through a process of what the German 
philosopher, Jürgen Habermas (1984), has called communicative action. In other words, the formation 
of the ideas of and sensitivity to right and wrong, good and bad conduct, as well as the variety of types 
of conduct that fit into any one of the categories, are acquired processes whose growth and 
entrenchment are culturally conditioned. Their transformation over time occurs on the matrix of 
societal discardment, modification, or adjustment of norms in order to credibly and strongly  locate 
itself within some order, both internally and in relation with the rest of the world.  The only thing that 
is firmly universal about morals is that we are morally teachable. 
 
                                                   
8 For a discussion of the communitarian context of these views, both Mbuya’s and Odera’s alike, see my 
Self and Community in a Changing World, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010, pp.222- 54 (Chapter 
Six). 
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Two things are questioned by people who think of the making, not only of the personality of agents, 
but also what they come to regard as plausible, possible, or in any other sense part of a discursively 
meaningful world. First, they question the view that persons bear characteristics that are 
transcendentally molded outside the context of their social conditioning. Rather, they argue, humans 
are naturally geared to develop their capacities in social contexts, and that without the communicative 
relations with others they are unlikely to develop into persons capable of performing acts that 
characterize them as agents. 
 
Secondly, in specifically moral terms, communitarians criticize the  intuitionist view which purports 
that persons are directed toward moral law by virtue only of their transcendental (metaphysical) nature 
on which the social context plays no significant role besides offering itself as a testing or practice 
ground. They contend, instead, that moral principles are the result of negotiated norms to reconcile 
interests, especially where conflict is real, possible, or imminent. They contend, then, that moral 
rationality cannot be reduced to a purely formal procedure for the calculation of costs and benefits for 
maximizing utility, as such a view ignores the reality of agents as located in concrete historical, social 
and political contexts. Rather, rationality is a process of reflection, deliberation and rational evaluation 
of possible consequences of actions and state of affairs for both self and others, because moral ideas 
stem from and are meant for practice in social contexts. Kwasi Wiredu has referred to the guiding 
principle in the formulation of moral norms as sympathetic impartiality (Wiredu 1996, 29-33), an idea 
that stresses the relational nature of moral and political ideals as aimed primarily at establishing the
norms of personal and collective relations between people. 
 
From village to global contexts 
Let me leave aside for a moment the communitarians’ conception of the self as well as their 
conception of community, and instead go back to the idea of distributive justice advanced by Paul 
Mbuya Akoko, although they clearly have bearings on each other. His recognition that there are 
certain individual characteristics that need to be both cultivated and celebrated as such suggests that 
not all social goods can be distributed in exactly the same manner: different goods will need different 
distributive principles based both on how people understand the goods themselves, and how they 
understand their own relations. 
 
The late A.B.C. Ocholla-Ayayo, himself an illustrious alumnus of Uppsala University and a 
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contemporary of Oruka there, wrote an excellent text on the Luo distributive system based on the 
rankings of lineages, families, and individuals within them (See Ocholla-Ayayo 1976). The first 
criterion in this system was that everyone had a right to primary resources for a decent human life, and 
these were distributed according to the system of seniority of the lineage and family one belonged to. 
Hence one could not do as they chose merely because they njoyed other material benefits - which, if 
they did have, must have been acquired through means xtraneous to the system. Such extraneous 
means would therefore not count as an advantage over those with whom she/he was in the distributive 
system. But, as Mbuya explains (Oruka ed. 1990, 141-2), if any individual, or family, enjoyed 
advantages over their kin, they would be expected to use such means to raise the life conditions of 
such needy kin through a system that finally would lift them out of poverty, so long as they put in their 
own efforts. 
 
The difference between liberalist and communalist or communitarian aspirations are evident. In 
Rawls’s view, it is enough for a just society to prvide the neutral framework (ruled by the principle 
of the veil of ignorance) of basic rights and liberties within which individuals can pursue their plans 
and attain their own values, consistent with similar l berties for others. Communitarians, by contrast, 
aspire to create an atmosphere that promotes a good society. Whatever else it might be, a naturalist 
approach to seeing the value of community should begin with an observation of the role community 
plays in enabling and enhancing the development of the capacity of its members. The responsive 
endowments of our bodies await the stimulation of others to turn us into agents, that is, functional 
members of our communities with different levels of c mpetency. 
 
I propose that it was Oruka’s contention that the realization of the basic mutual dependency of 
humans cannot be abandoned suddenly when it comes t acquisition of social and material goods. The 
concept of right, as articulated in recent liberal ideology at least, bears the weakness of visualizing an 
abstract individual whom it extricates from the social ontext upon which the goods of her/his own 
self-interest depend. In Oruka’s view, it is precisly because of this abstraction that the capitalist 
framework on which Rawls’s own theory was based permits “an infinite socio-economic gap between 
the rich and the poor” (Oruka 1997, 117). But (and I can almost visualize Oruka arguing both firmly 
and passionately) the pretensions of capitalism must be morally bizzare, as no accumulation of wealth 
can happen without the commission of some wrongs along the way. Hence, in his view, it bears an 
intrinsic evil in the form of social and economic inequality (Oruka 1997, 118). For this to be true, 
Oruka must envision an accumulation practice that is based on more than the sacrificial capital build-
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up from personal savings alone as described by Rawls. 
 
To say that the conflict between right and good is a difficult matter is probably an understatement, as 
often people who stand on either side of the two values appear to be resigned to irreconcilable 
opposition. Those who ascribe to the liberal ethic, for example, regardless of their economic status, do 
not always appreciate the prioritization of good over right even when they stand to benefit, hence their 
opposition to any form of welfare promotion if, in their perception, it reduces their individual freedom 
to control decisions about how to live their lives as is well exemplified in the raging American debat 
on healthcare reform. According to Oruka, liberals support what he calls “a society of unbalanced or 
wild justice” (Oruka 1997, 118 ff.),9 meaning a society where the system has a built-in mechanism by 
which certain people are condemned for extinction as they are excluded a priori from the benefits of 
general social, economic, and scientific progress. 
 
Now translate the above into an international perspective, or, as Oruka preferred, a global one, and 
ask yourself: why should I be required to worry about the welfare of people far away across the 
oceans, people I have not and probably will never se ?” But, surely, thinking about people and 
cultures far away from home is not new. Indeed, we engage these distant fellow inhabitants of the 
globe in many other ways everyday. Some of my readers will remember the now classic statement by 
Muhammad Ali, the American boxing legend, then Casius Clay, when he was opposing his drafting 
into the US army, probably in preparation for shipment to fight in the Vietnam war. He said, and I 
only paraphrase, “I will not go fight the Vietcongs; they have not thrown no stone at me...” Yes, it is 
easy to ship out young men and women to go fight distant people in the name of political causes, yet 
we debate far more eloquently about whether we should care to promote human good across our 
borders. 
 
This is not about helping people struck by tragedies of earthquakes, or tsunamis and other natural 
calamities from time to time. Instead, it is about establishing norms for a consistent and sustainable 
practice among the citizens of the globe, whether as n tions, organizations, or individuals, but 
particularly the first two, to enhance human well-being by enhancing the capacity of everyone. 
Politicians have remarked for a long time, especially when scrambling for explanations behind acts of 
                                                   
9See also “Rawls’ Ideological Affinity and Justice as Egalitarian Fairness”, in Justice, Social and 
Global, op. cit., pp.81-84. 
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violence, that “such and such people carry out acts of violence against us because they are envious of 
our values”, and things like that. In the same breath, it has been suggested, also in political discourse, 
that hatred across the globe is engendered by economic inequities and the pervasiveness of poverty. 
Liberals, and nationalists of certain brands, have argued that help to distant people can be warranted 
only by commensurate or greater benefits from doing so, whatever the nature of the gain. I count those 
who offer aid for religious reasons to be among these, because their action is not based on exactly a 
moral norm. 
 
Oruka and the ethics of global care  
What, then, is a plausible argument in support of global caring? Is it enough to regard it merely as an 
extension of the norms that sustain a community? There are at least two tracts that have tried to 
address this issue. One, let us call it cosmopolitanism, suggests that the flaw in the lack of a 
sustainable global ethical system lies in patriotism, the mindset that makes us think of ourselves as 
members of specific nations or communities distinct from others. This, Martha Nussbaum has argued 
(Nussbaum 2002, 3-17), mitigates against the classil Greek notion of Cosmos and Cosmopolis, in 
which all people were citizens and which, she argued (at least in the early stages of her development 
of this idea), we should all return to. Patriotism, she contended, creates an atmosphere, under the 
protection of sovereignty, that engenders relativism and makes it easier for oppressive regimes or 
factions within national borders to target those thy do not like, and harder for people and nations 
considered foreign to intervene in political ills across the globe such as we witnessed in the case of 
Rwanda and the Balkans a little later. Instead, cosmopolitans argue, the world should push for the 
erasure of national borders, thus making the world a continuous global community, a unitary polis as 
an unmarked (boundaryless) jurisdiction. 
 
The other view, while not defending political crimes, holds the position that there must be respects in 
which our patriotism ought to be defended, such as in cultural nationalism that aims only at advancing 
those practices, so long as they are rational in themselves, and rationally respectful of other similar 
ones, which give us a certain way to do as we may rationally choose to do. Sometimes I want to think 
of only the latter view as adhering to liberal norms, but they both do. This latter view, as defended 
outstandingly by Kwame Anthony Appiah, argues (Appiah 2002, 21-29), as Rawls would - or so I 
believe he would - that the only reason for us to in ervene in the patriotic domains of others would be 
if individuals or groups there were being violently targeted, or their lives were being deliberately made 
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worse by the actions of others for whatever reason; otherwise, they should be left alone. Individuals 
across the globe should be connected by the rationali y of their choices; for the rest, they can be who 
and what they want to be. Some have criticized this approach to international relations, calling the 
reasoning justificatory, such as we saw spark the American intervention in Iraq, or Libya most 
recently. Questions are almost always raised, however, regarding the real objectives of such 
interventions. In Iraq, questions abound regarding the benefits accrued to the ordinary Iraqi citizens as 
a result of the American intervention. 
 
Tentative conclusion 
I have indicated that, in Oruka’s view, liberalism is unacceptable precisely for its apathy toward the 
human condition where there is no deliberate harm perpetrated by anyone, whether an organization or 
individual. This raises the question whether one should intervene in cases where nations use social 
isolation and economic deprivation of some groups of their own citizens as means of political 
victimization. Who, in such cases - and they are numerous across the globe - determines the punitive 
nature of such conditions? And who takes the initiative of intervention? Oruka did not build a detailed 
account of how a global distributive system would work, but he was nonetheless unflinching about the 
unacceptability of claims over natural resources based on territorial boundaries which, as we all know, 
serve primarily an exclusionary role. Perhaps - and I emphasize “perhaps” - he visualized the 
migratory nature of human spread and occupation of the world, and argued that noone should in fact 
make permanent claims over resources other than those that they have developed by their own 
investments. It would follow, then, that there needs to be a format for the distribution of natural 
resources either in their crude form, or, with proper methods of compensation, as refined products to 
those societies which did not have them. His view is that world migrations and expansions were 
hardly the result of knowledge of the location of the world’s resource reservoirs. The discoveries 
came later, and still continue in our own times. 
 
The suggestion would appear to be, then, that we apply the same analytic models for understanding 
the social and psychological processes of identity as grounds for appreciating the socio-psychological 
groundings of morals at the personal levels to international relations. In other words, it is in the wide 
world web of economic and political relations that we realize both that other people are indeed other 
than us, but also that they are like us, and that i is he latter, our similarities in certain crucial respects, 
that push us to establish norms that reflect these ba ic  similarities of us and of our claims. Such 
48 D.A. Masolo 
 
realization may catapult care not just into the ranks of moral theory, but also into how we think of 
justice differently from a global perspective. Doing good, not for the occasional humanitarian ground 
based on sympathy, but in service of a moral norm that aims at uplifting others, each other, toward a 
common human good. This is the net worth of a community, any community, local, national, regional, 
or global. The political ramifications of this principle suggest a critique of the so-called aissez-faire 
policies and, above all, of corruption or politically-driven kleptocracy at the expense of the ordinary 
folk whose lives, both individual and collective, are made worse as a result. It is no wonder, therefore, 
that Oruka defended political positions that aimed at protecting the interests of those who had no 
public  platform. I am thinking, for example, of the theme of Oruka’s Punishment and Terrorism in 
Africa (Oruka 1976; Second edition 1985), his far less discussed book, Oginga Odinga: His 
Philosophy and Beliefs (Oruka 1992), and of his defense of the concept of law as a moral ide  (see 
Oruka et. Al. 1989). 
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